On the role of pre-determined rules for HRM policies

Open Access
Authors
Publication date 2011
Series Tinbergen Institute discussion paper, 2011-034/1
Number of pages 26
Publisher Amsterdam: Tinbergen Institute
Organisations
  • Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) - Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
Abstract Using simple game-theoretical models, this paper studies the role of pre-determined rules for HRM policies. We consider a model in which HRM decisions affect employees' self-images and thereby their motivation. We show that in the absence of written rules, managers are too reluctant (1) to differentiate between employees on the basis of their abilities, and (2) to terminate employment of employees on probation. Generally, organizations benefit from committing to strict rules for various HRM practices.
Document type Working paper
Language English
Published at http://www.tinbergen.nl/discussionpapers/11034.pdf
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1161fulltext.pdf (Submitted manuscript)
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