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Results: 7
Number of items: 7
  • Open Access
    Angelucci, C., & Han, M. A. (2011). Monitoring managers through corporate compliance programs. (Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics working paper; No. 2010-14). Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics.
  • Open Access
    Han, M. A. (2011). Delegation and firms' ability to collude: a comment. (Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics working paper; No. 2011-02). Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1742738_code503951.pdf?abstractid=1742738&mirid=1
  • Open Access
    Han, M. A. (2011). Vertical relations in cartel theory: managerial incentives, buyer groups & antitrust damages. [Thesis, fully internal, Universiteit van Amsterdam].
  • Open Access
    Han, M. A. (2010). Strategic delegation improves cartel stability. (Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics working paper; No. 2010-15). Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1729144_code503951.pdf?abstractid=1729144&mirid=1
  • Open Access
    Angelucci, C., & Han, M. A. (2010). Monitoring managers through corporate compliance programs. (Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics working paper; No. 2010-14). Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics.
  • Open Access
    Han, M. A. (2010). Short-term managerial contracts facilitate cartels. (Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics working paper; No. 2010-16). Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1730209_code503951.pdf?abstractid=1730209&mirid=1
  • Han, M. A., Schinkel, M. P., & Tuinstra, J. (2009). The overcharge as a measure for antitrust damages. (Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics working paper; No. 2008-08). Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1387096
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