Structural Distortions and Decentralized Fiscal Policies in EMU

Authors
Publication date 2001
Publisher CEPR Discussion Paper Series
Organisations
  • Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) - Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
Abstract
The combination of discretionary monetary policy, labour market distortions and nominal wage rigidity yields an inflation bias as monetary policy tries to exploit nominal wage contracts to address labour market distortions. Although an inflation target eliminates this inflation bias, it creates a conflict between monetary policy and discretionary fiscal policy if fiscal policy is set at a higher frequency than nominal wages. To avoid the associated excessive accumulation of public debt, ceilings on public debt are called for. If countries
differ substantially in terms of structural distortions or economic shocks, country-specific debt targets must complement uniform debt ceilings in order to prevent decentralized fiscal authorities from employing debt policy strategically.


JEL Classification: E52, E58, E61, E62
Document type Working paper
Published at http://www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?dpno=2851&Previous.x=0&Previous.y=0
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