Emotion experience

Authors
Publication date 2005
Journal Cognition & Emotion
Volume | Issue number 19 | 4
Pages (from-to) 473-497
Organisations
  • Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences (FMG) - Psychology Research Institute (PsyRes)
Abstract
Highly divergent accounts exist of the nature of emotional feelings. Following Lambie and Marcel (2002), that divergence is traced back to actual differences in experience that result from variations in the involvement and direction of attention during emotions. The dimensions of variation include first versus second order experience, world- versus self-focus, appraisal or action-readiness focus, and attention mode (synthetic-analytic, immersed-detached). It is argued that the most characteristic form during actual emotional events consists of the more or less immersed and synthetic perception of an emotionally meaningful world or of oneself as emotionally meaningful. Meaning consists of perceived qualities that represent appraisal and action readiness. Although information from one's body is central for all emotion experience, it is not central in all emotion experience. Feeling of the body in a particular state represents detached analytic self-focused awareness only. Emotion experience not only represents a perspective on emotional reactions but also contributes to the constitution of those reactions, notably with respect to attention shifts, action initiation and action guidance, and emotion regulation. It is a major factor in constituting a representation of "self" and in establishing social coherence.
Document type Article
Published at https://doi.org/10.1080/02699930441000346
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