Strategies of Persuasion, Manipulation and Propaganda Psychological and Social Aspects

Open Access
Authors
Publication date 2015
Host editors
  • J. van Benthem
  • S. Ghosh
  • R. Verbrugge
Book title Models of Strategic Reasoning
Book subtitle Logics, Games, and Communities
ISBN
  • 9783662485392
ISBN (electronic)
  • 9783662485408
Series Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Event International Conference on Strategies in Multi-agent Systems: From Implicit to Implementable, 2012
Pages (from-to) 255-291
Publisher Berlin: Springer
Organisations
  • Interfacultary Research - Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC)
Abstract
How can one influence the behavior of others? What is a good persuasion strategy? It is obviously of great importance to determine what information best to provide and also how to convey it. To delineate how and when manipulation of others can be successful, the first part of this chapter reviews basic findings of decision and game theory on models of strategic communication. But there is also a social aspect to manipulation, concerned with determining who we should address so as best to promote our opinion in a larger group or society as a whole. The second half of this chapter therefore looks at a novel extension of DeGroot’s [19] classical model of opinion dynamics that allows agents to strategically influence some agents more than others. This side-by-side investigation of psychological and social aspects enables us to reflect on the general question what a good manipulation strategy is. We submit that successful manipulation requires exploiting critical weaknesses, such as limited capability of strategic reasoning, limited awareness, susceptibility to cognitive biases or to potentially indirect social pressure.
Document type Chapter
Language English
Published at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48540-8_8
Other links https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84955306552
Downloads
Strategies of Persuasion (Final published version)
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