Punitive sanctions and the transition rate from welfare to work

Open Access
Authors
Publication date 2004
Journal Journal of labor economics
Volume | Issue number 22 | 1
Pages (from-to) 211-241
Organisations
  • Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) - Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
Abstract In The Netherlands, the average exit rate out of welfare is dramatically low. Most welfare recipients have to comply with guidelines on job search effort that are imposed by the welfare agency. If they do not, then a sanction in the form of a temporary benefit reduction can be imposed. This paper investigates the effect of such sanctions on the transition rate from welfare to work using a unique set of rich administrative data on welfare recipients. We find that the imposition of sanctions substantially increases the individual transition rate from welfare to work.
Document type Article
Language English
Published at https://doi.org/10.1086/380408
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sancrww.pdf (Submitted manuscript)
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