Self-Persuasion: Evidence from Field Experiments at International Debating Competitions

Open Access
Authors
Publication date 04-2022
Journal The American Economic Review
Volume | Issue number 112 | 4
Pages (from-to) 1118-1146
Organisations
  • Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
  • Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) - Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
Abstract
Laboratory evidence shows that when people have to argue for a given position, they persuade themselves about the position's factual and moral superiority. Such self-persuasion limits the potential of communication to resolve conflict and reduce polarization. We test for this phenomenon in a field setting, at international debating competitions that randomly assign experienced and motivated debaters to argue one side of a topical motion. We find self-persuasion in factual beliefs and confidence in one's position. Effect sizes are smaller than in the laboratory, but robust to a one-hour exchange of arguments and a tenfold increase in incentives for accuracy.
Document type Article
Note Copyright 2022 American Economic Association. - With supplementary files.
Language English
Related dataset Data and Code for: Self-Persuasion: Evidence from Field Experimentsat International Debating Competitions
Published at https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20200372
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aer.20200372 (Final published version)
Supplementary materials
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