Contempt, like any other social affect, can be an emotion as well as a sentiment

Authors
Publication date 30-10-2017
Journal Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Article number e237
Volume | Issue number 40
Organisations
  • Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences (FMG) - Psychology Research Institute (PsyRes)
Abstract Gervais and Fessler assert that contempt is (a) not an emotion (or an attitude), but (b) a sentiment. Here, we challenge the validity and empirical basis of these two assertions, arguing that contempt, as many other emotions, can be both an emotion and sentiment.
Document type Comment/Letter to the editor
Note Open Peer Commentary to: M.M. Gervais, Daniel M.T. Fessler (2017) On the deep structure of social affect: Attitudes, emotions, sentiments, and the case of “contempt”, In: Behavioral and Brain Sciences 40:e225.
Language English
Published at https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X16000765
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