Evolution in games with a continuous action space

Open Access
Authors
Publication date 2009
Journal Economic Theory
Volume | Issue number 39 | 3
Pages (from-to) 355-376
Organisations
  • Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) - Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
  • Faculty of Science (FNWI) - Korteweg-de Vries Institute for Mathematics (KdVI)
Abstract Allowing for games with a continuous action space, we investigate how evolutionary stability, the existence of a uniform invasion barrier, local superiority and asymptotic stability relate to each other. This is done without restricting the populations of which we want to investigate the stability to monomorphic population states or to strategies with finite support.
Document type Article
Language English
Published at https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0338-8
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