How bidder's number affects optimal reserve price in first-price auction under risk aversion
| Authors |
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| Publication date |
2011
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| Journal |
Economics Letters
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| Volume | Issue number |
113 | 1
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| Pages (from-to) |
29-31
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| Organisations |
-
Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) - Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
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| Abstract |
This paper shows that in the classic symmetric and independent private value environments, the seller’s optimal reserve price is a decreasing function of the number of bidders in the first-price auctions when the seller and/or buyers are risk averse.
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| Document type |
Article
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| Language |
English
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| Published at |
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.05.041
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