Can reasons be self-undermining?
| Authors | |
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| Publication date | 2012 |
| Journal | Philosophia |
| Volume | Issue number | 40 | 2 |
| Pages (from-to) | 411-414 |
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| Abstract |
The characterization of objective, normative reasons to φ as facts (or truths) that count in favor of φ-ing is widely accepted. But are there any further conditions that considerations which count in favor of φ-ing must meet, in order to count as a reason to φ? In this brief paper, I consider and reject one such condition, recently proposed by Caspar Hare. |
| Document type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Published at | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9324-7 |
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