Multiple steady states, limit cycles and chaotic attractors in evolutionary games with Logit Dynamics

Open Access
Authors
Publication date 2010
Series CeNDEF working paper, 10-04
Number of pages 40
Publisher Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam
Organisations
  • Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) - Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
Abstract
This paper investigates, by means of simple, three and four strategy games, the occurrence of periodic and chaotic behaviour in a smooth version of the Best Response Dynamics, the Logit Dynamics. The main finding is that, unlike Replicator Dynamics, generic Hopf bifurcation and thus, stable limit cycles, do occur under the Logit Dynamics, even for three strategy games. Moreover, we show that the Logit Dynamics displays another bifurcation which cannot to occur under the Replicator Dynamics: the fold catastrophe. Finally, we find, in a four strategy game, a period-doubling route to chaotic dynamics under a 'weighted' version of the Logit Dynamics.
Document type Working paper
Language English
Published at http://www1.fee.uva.nl/cendef/publications/papers/HommesOchea2010.pdf
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325309.pdf (Final published version)
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