Cartel Stability in Experimental First-Price Sealed-Bid and English auctions
| Authors | |
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| Publication date | 07-2020 |
| Journal | International Journal of Industrial Organization |
| Article number | 102642 |
| Volume | Issue number | 71 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| Organisations |
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| Abstract | Using laboratory experiments, we compare the stability of bidding rings in the first-price sealed-bid auction and the English auction in a heterogeneous-value setting. In both a re-matching condition and a fixed-matching condition, we observe that bidding rings are more stable in the English auction than in the first-price sealed-bid auction. In both conditions, the first-price sealed-bid auction dominates the English auction in terms of average revenue and the revenue spread. The English auction outperforms the first-price sealed-bid auction in terms of efficiency. |
| Document type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Related dataset | Data for: Cartel stability in experimental auctions Cartel stability in experimental first-price and English auctions |
| Published at | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102642 |
| Downloads |
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