Multiple equilibria and limit cycles in evolutonary games with Logit Dynamics

Open Access
Authors
Publication date 2012
Journal Games and Economic Behavior
Volume | Issue number 74 | 1
Pages (from-to) 434-441
Organisations
  • Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) - Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
Abstract This note shows, by means of two simple, three-strategy games, the existence of stable periodic orbits and of multiple, interior steady states in a smooth version of the Best-Response Dynamics, the Logit Dynamics. The main finding is that, unlike Replicator Dynamics, generic Hopf bifurcation and thus, stable limit cycles, occur under the Logit Dynamics, even for three-strategy games. We also show that the Logit Dynamics displays another bifurcation which cannot occur under the Replicator Dynamics: the fold bifurcation, with non-monotonic creation and disappearance of steady states.

Document type Article
Note The final publication of this article is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.014.
Language English
Published at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.014
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