At the Edges of Liberal Care Disability and Ethics Between Dependence and Freedom

Caring relationships bring to the fore two competing ethical impulses in liberal societies: to protect people and to leave them alone, to respect their vulnerability and to respect their freedom. Nowhere is this more true than in the contemporary care of people with intellectual disabilities in the British context this article focuses on. These individuals are in care because they have been classified as lacking the mental ability to look after themselves. Yet contemporary care aspires to treat these people as having an equal right to choice and independence. This contradiction would seem to be the most compelling evidence of just how ill suited liberal ideals are to handling the depths of care and dependence. I challenge this received wisdom by demonstrating how carers, mandated to live this paradox day to day, innovate a relationship of care that renders such individuals liberally free, even as they remain extensively dependent. Understanding the work involved in actually living liberalism and care on the ground requires moving beyond a conceptual opposition between dependence and freedom that dominates our thinking. Doing so shows us the unexplored possibilities of living with dependence that lie dormant within care.