Punching above One's Weight On Overcommitment in Election Campaigns
| Authors |
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|---|---|
| Publication date | 06-2024 |
| Journal | De Economist |
| Volume | Issue number | 172 |
| Pages (from-to) | 121–139 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| Organisations |
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| Abstract | In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model to study how candidates compete in elections when voters care about the winner's ability to implement policies. In our model, the candidates make commitments before the election regarding the plans they will try to implement if elected. These commitments serve as a signal of ability. In equilibrium, candidates make overambitious promises. While the candidate with the highest ability wins, the electorate may be better off having a random candidate implement her best plan, rather than seeing the winner implementing an overambitious plan. |
| Document type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Published at | https://doi.org/10.1007/s10645-024-09435-5 |
| Downloads |
Haan_et_al-2024-De_Economist
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