A Revision of the Neoclassical Economics Methodology appraising Hausman's Mill-twist, Robbins' gist and Popper whist

A distinction is made between the professed methodology of neoclassical economics (which is some variety of Popper’s falsificationism) and its methodology as based on its practice. The main part of the paper focusses on the latter. Characterising the practice of neoclassical economics as an ‘axiomatic positivism’, Section 1 discusses its three main twentieth century methodological episodes (Robbins, Friedman, McCloskey). Section 2 discusses Hausman’s (1992) attempt to provide a full revision of the official methodology, for which he takes recourse to the methodological work of J.S. Mill. Hausman’s methodology is problematical because of: (1) an inadequate distinction between a normative and a descriptive methodology; (2) an insufficient consideration of the empirical stages of theory appraisal; (3) a misleading account of the tendential character of economic generalizations, as revealed by his treatment of them as ceteris paribus formulations. Further, an arbitrary part of the theory assessment in Hausman’s approach seems to run in praxeological terms, apparently divorced from the methodological appraisal. Section 3 presents, most briefly, a methodological track alternative to Hausman’s.