The Principle of Predictive Irrelevance, or Why Intervals Should Not be Used for Model Comparison Featuring a Point Null Hypothesis

Open Access
Authors
Publication date 2020
Host editors
  • C.W. Gruber
Book title The Theory of Statistics in Psychology
Book subtitle Applications, Use and Misunderstandings
ISBN
  • 9783030480424
  • 9783030480448
  • 9783030480455
ISBN (electronic)
  • 9783030480431
Series Annals of Theoretical Psychology
Pages (from-to) 111-129
Publisher Cham: Springer
Organisations
  • Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences (FMG) - Psychology Research Institute (PsyRes)
Abstract
The principle of predictive irrelevance states that when two competing models predict a data set equally well, that data set cannot be used to discriminate the models and – for that specific purpose – the data set is evidentially irrelevant. To highlight the ramifications of the principle, we first show how a single binomial observation can be irrelevant in the sense that it carries no evidential value for discriminating the null hypothesis θ = 1∕2 from a broad class of alternative hypotheses that allow θ to be between 0 and 1. In contrast, the Bayesian credible interval suggests that a single binomial observation does provide some evidence against the null hypothesis. We then generalize this paradoxical result to infinitely long data sequences that are predictively irrelevant throughout. Examples feature a test of a binomial rate and a test of a normal mean. These maximally uninformative data (MUD) sequences yield credible intervals and confidence intervals that are certain to exclude the point of test as the sequence lengthens. The resolution of this paradox requires the insight that interval estimation methods – and, consequently, p-values – may not be used for model comparison involving a point null hypothesis.
Document type Chapter
Language English
Published at https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/rqnu5 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48043-1_8
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