Bargaining in the shadow of the European settlement procedure for cartels
| Authors |
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| Publication date |
2011
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| Journal |
The Antitrust Bulletin
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| Volume | Issue number |
56 | 2
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| Pages (from-to) |
461-481
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| Organisations |
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Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) - Amsterdam Business School Research Institute (ABS-RI)
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Faculty of Law (FdR) - Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics (ACLE)
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| Abstract |
The article discusses the European Commission's legal settlement procedures regarding cartels, with emphasis given to its denial of plea bargaining bargaining and negotiation. The author argues that such a hard stance on settlements may actually have negative effects on cartelization deterrence measures. The Commission's bargaining power revolved around its adherence to fixed fine reductions.
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| Document type |
Article
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| Language |
English
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| Published at |
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=67642755&site=ehost-live
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