Green antitrust: (More) friendly fire in the fight against climate change

Open Access
Authors
Publication date 11-2021
Series Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies Research Paper, 2020-72
Number of pages 26
Publisher Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics
Organisations
  • Faculty of Law (FdR)
  • Interfacultary Research - Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics (ACLE)
  • Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) - Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
  • Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
Abstract
The green antitrust movement aims to increase sustainability efforts by allowing restrictions of competition. Yet the economic evidence so far points to more, not less, competition as the right stimulus for inducing sustainability efforts. Incentives to produce more sustainably are stronger when firms compete than when they are allowed to make sustainability agreements. This is also true when firms are intrinsically motivated to promote sustainability. It is not good policy to relax the general competition rules in order to accommodate the rare genuine sustainability agreement. However well-intended, green antitrust risks damaging both competition and the environment. It will suppress the gathering market forces for companies to produce more sustainably, overburden competition authorities, invite abusive cartel greenwashing, and give the part of government that should promote sustainability further excuse to shun their responsibility for designing proper regulation.
Document type Working paper
Language English
Related publication Green Antitrust: Friendly Fire in the Fight against Climate Change
Published at https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3749147
Other links https://awards.concurrences.com/en/awards/2022/academic-articles/green-antitrust-friendly-fire-in-the-fight-against-climate-change
Downloads
SSRN-id3749147 (Final published version)
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