Games and Quantity implicatures
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| Publication date | 2008 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Methodology |
| Volume | Issue number | 15 | 3 |
| Pages (from-to) | 261-274 |
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| Abstract | In this paper we seek to account for scalar implicatures and Horn's division of pragmatic labor in game-theoretical terms by making use mainly of refinements of the standard solution concept of signaling games. Scalar implicatures are accounted for in terms of Farrell's (1993) notion of a 'neologism-proof' equilibrium together with Grice's maxim of Quality. Horn's division of pragmatic labor is accounted for in terms of Cho and Kreps' (1987) notion of 'equilibrium domination' and their 'Intuitive Criterion'. |
| Document type | Article |
| Published at |
https://doi.org/10.1080/13501780802321376
(Final published version)
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