Aristotle's Rhetoric and the persistence of emotions in the courtroom
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| Publication date | 2018 |
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| Book title | Aristotle on emotions in law and politics |
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| ISBN (electronic) |
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| Series | Law and philosophy library |
| Pages (from-to) | 385-399 |
| Publisher | Cham: Springer |
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| Abstract |
This chapter investigates whether, according to Aristotle, participation
in judicial practices promotes the development of the moral,
intellectual or civic virtues of the rhetorician or the audience. A
close reading of Aristotle’s Rhetoric reveals that Aristotle did
not understand the art of rhetoric as having an inherently moral
purpose. Rather, for Aristotle the art of rhetoric in a judicial setting
implied an understanding of the available means of persuasion and
entailed the ability of appealing to the emotions of the audience in
order to win a lawsuit. For this purpose the rhetorician may arouse
emotions that, in themselves, are morally questionable. Therefore,
Aristotle emphasized the need for laws that govern the judicial process
and prevent or curtail corrupting practices. Based on a reading of
Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the chapter takes issue with the
participatory democracy approach, which traces its roots to Aristotle’s
political thought, and presents the argument that political activity,
including jury duty, necessarily constitutes an experience that promotes
the moral or civic development of the citizen.
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| Document type | Chapter |
| Language | English |
| Published at | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66703-4_18 |
| Published at | https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uvanl/reader.action?docID=5295059&ppg=384 |
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