Truthful resolutions: A new perspective on false-answer sensitivity
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Publication date | 2016 |
| Journal | Proceedings from Semantics and Linguistic Theory |
| Event | Semantics and Linguistic Theory 26, 2016 |
| Volume | Issue number | 26 |
| Pages (from-to) | 122-141 |
| Organisations |
|
| Abstract |
Responsive verbs like know embed both declarative and interrogative complements. Standard accounts of such verbs are reductive: they assume that whether an individual stands in a knowledge-wh relation to a question is determined by whether she stands in a knowledge-that relation to some answer to the question. George (2013) observed that knowledge-wh, however, not only depends on knowledge-that but also on false belief---a fact that reductive accounts can't capture. We develop an account that is not reductive but uniform: it assumes a single entry for interrogative-embedding and declarative-embedding uses of a responsive verb. The key insight that allows us to capture the false-belief dependency of knowledge-wh is that verbs like know are sensitive to both true and false answers to the embedded question. Formally, this is achieved through a novel, fine-grained way of representing the meaning of a clausal complement in terms of so-called truthful resolutions. The resulting analysis gives us a unifying perspective, under which false-answer sensitivity comes out as a general characteristic common to all levels of exhaustivity. |
| Document type | Article |
| Note | Proceedings of the 26th Semantics and Linguistic Theory Conference, held at the University of Texas at Austin May 12-15, 2016, edited by Mary Moroney, Carol-Rose Little, Jacob Collard, and Dan Burgdorf. |
| Language | English |
| Published at | https://doi.org/10.3765/salt.v26i0.3791 |
| Downloads |
3791-5177-1-PB
(Final published version)
|
| Permalink to this page | |
