How to measure the deterrrence effects of merger policy: frequency or composition?

Authors
Publication date 2009
ISBN
  • ISSN Nr. 0722 - 6748
Series WZB Discussion Paper, SP II 2009-13
Number of pages 15
Publisher Berlin: WISSENSCHAFTSZENTRUM BERLIN
Organisations
  • Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) - Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
Abstract We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is
a more appropriate indicator of underlying changes in merger policy than the
relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based
deterrence). This has strong implications for the empirical analysis of the
deterrence effects of merger policy enforcement, and potential implications
regarding how to reduce anti-competitive merger proposals.
Keywords: antitrust, deterrence, merger polic
JEL Classification: L40, L49, K21
Document type Report
Published at http://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2009/ii09-13.pdf
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