| Authors |
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| Publication date |
2009
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| Series |
CREED working paper series, 2009
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| Number of pages |
18
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| Publisher |
Amsterdam: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde
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| Organisations |
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Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) - Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
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| Abstract |
Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior,these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.(This paper is a revised version of "On the size of the winning set in the presence of interest groups".)
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| Document type |
Report
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| Published at |
http://www1.fee.uva.nl/creed/pdffiles/SCW1009STW.pdf
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