Quantal response models in step-level public good games
| Authors |
|
| Publication date |
1998
|
| Journal |
European Journal of Political Economy
|
| Volume | Issue number |
14 | 1
|
| Pages (from-to) |
89-100
|
| Organisations |
-
Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) - Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
|
| Abstract |
The effect of adding noise to both an equilibrium model and a naive Bayesian model of behavior in step-level public good games is studied. Quantal response equilibria are derived for these games and a naive Bayesian quantal response function is presented. The models are fit for experimental data from such a game and compared. The results seem more promising for the naive Bayesian model than for the equilibrium model.
|
| Document type |
Article
|
| Language |
English
|
| Published at |
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0176-2680(97)00044-X
|
|
Permalink to this page
|
Back
