Collective versus individual pension schemes: a welfare-theoretical perspective

Open Access
Authors
Publication date 24-10-2014
Series Netspar Discussion Paper, DP10/2014-045
Number of pages 37
Publisher Tilburg: Netspar
Organisations
  • Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) - Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
Abstract Collective pension contracts allow for intergenerational risk sharing with the unborn. They therefore imply a higher level of social welfare than individual accounts. Collective pension contracts also imply a sub-optimal allocation of consumption across time periods and states of nature however. Hence, collective pension contracts also reduce social welfare. This paper explores the welfare effects of a number of collective pension contracts, distinguishing between the two welfare effects. We find that collective schemes can be either superior or inferior to individual schemes.
Document type Working paper
Language English
Published at http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=135242
Downloads
434199 (Submitted manuscript)
Permalink to this page
Back