Loyaliteit binnen de rechterlijke macht

Judges in the Netherlands have recently expressed their concerns in the media over the organization of the judiciary and the pressure to deliver output. At the same time, they consider themselves highly loyal to their work. In this article we explore this seeming contradiction by studying the developments in the selection, training and organisation of the judiciary and considering the consequences that these developments could have on the loyalty of judges. In doing so, a distinction is made between loyalty to the profession, to the organisation and to colleagues. We follow Hirschman’s theory on Exit, Voice and Loyalty and determine that the act of judges expressing their concerns (instead of exiting the judiciary) is essentially a sign of their loyalty. However, we reason that this displays more loyalty to the profession than to the organisation. Due to changes in the selection and training of judges, more candidates who were formerly employed in other settings, e.g. in advocacy, will enter the profession. With their socialisation taking place in a more business-like setting, where values such as efficiency and productivity are significant, it is expected that they will be more willing to accept the new public management values which are criticized by the present generation of judges.