Agency problems and organizational costs in slave-run businesses

Open Access
Authors
Publication date 12-10-2011
Series Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics working paper, 2011-13
Number of pages 30
Publisher Amsterdam: Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics, University of Amsterdam
Organisations
  • Interfacultary Research - Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics (ACLE)
  • Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) - Amsterdam Business School Research Institute (ABS-RI)
Abstract
We examine the economic organization of slave-run businesses: slaves endowed with certain assets (the peculium). The evidence points predominantly to businesses of small or medium size, suggesting that there must have been some constraints to growth. We identify both agency problems arising within the business organization (governance problems) and agency problems arising between the business organization and its creditors (limited access to finance). We show that, although the praetorian remedies had a remarkable mitigating effect, agency problems operated as a constraint to the expansion of these business organizations, both in terms of individuals involved and in terms of capital invested.
Document type Working paper
Language English
Related publication Agency Problems and Organizational Costs in Slave-Run Businesses
Published at https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1942802
Downloads
SSRN-id1942802_1_.pdf (Submitted manuscript)
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