Deliberationally Useless Conditionals
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Publication date | 03-2020 |
| Journal | Episteme |
| Volume | Issue number | 17 | 1 |
| Pages (from-to) | 1-27 |
| Organisations |
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| Abstract | Decision theorists tend to treat indicative conditionals with reservation, because they can easily lead a deliberating agent astray. However, many indicatives can be very helpful in contexts of deliberation, so denying them all a role in such contexts seems to be overkill. We show that a recently revived inferential view on conditionals provides a straightforward explanation of why some indicatives are unassertable in contexts of deliberation and hints at a way of telling “deliberationally useless” and “deliberationally useful” conditionals apart. |
| Document type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Published at | https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.9 |
| Published at | http://karolinakrzyzanowska.com/pdfs/deliberation.pdf |
| Downloads |
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