Morals in Multi-Unit Markets

Open Access
Authors
Publication date 10-2024
Journal Journal of the European Economic Association
Volume | Issue number 22 | 5
Pages (from-to) 2225-2260
Number of pages 36
Organisations
  • Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB)
  • Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) - Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
Abstract

We examine how the erosion of morals, norms, and norm compliance in markets depends on the market power of individual traders. Previously studied markets allow traders to exchange at most one unit and provide market power to individual traders by de-activating two forces: (i) the replacement logic, whereby immoral trading is justified by the belief that others would trade otherwise and (ii) market selection, by which the least moral trader determines aggregate quantities. In an experiment, we compare single-unit to (more common) multi-unit markets, which may activate these forces. Multi-unit markets, in contrast to single-unit markets, lead to a complete erosion of morals. This is associated primarily with a deterioration in norm compliance: the observed level of immoral trade is in contrast with the prevailing social norm. The replacement logic is the main mechanism driving this finding.

Document type Article
Note With supplementary files, including teaching slides
Language English
Published at https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvae001
Other links https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85199780662
Downloads
jvae001 (Final published version)
Supplementary materials
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