Truth in Fiction, Impossible Worlds, and Belief Revision
| Authors |
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|---|---|
| Publication date | 2019 |
| Journal | Australasian Journal of Philosophy |
| Volume | Issue number | 97 | 1 |
| Pages (from-to) | 178-193 |
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| Abstract | We present a theory of truth in fiction that improves on Lewis's [1978] ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand Lewis's possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or impossible worlds. Second, we model truth in fiction as (make-believed) belief revision via ideas from dynamic epistemic logic. We explain the major objections raised against Lewis's original view and show that our theory overcomes them. |
| Document type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Published at | https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2018.1435698 |
| Downloads |
Truth in Fiction
(Final published version)
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