Renting political violence A political economy of rents, access and violence delegation

What explains variation in incumbents’ choice of political violence perpetrators? Incumbents often sponsor violence in elections but do not typically engage in it themselves, instead delegating violence to security forces, armed groups, party wings, or regular citizens. Existing theory poorly explains such variation, which has privileged incumbents’ incentives to plausibly deny their involvement. This article develops a theory centred around variation in electoral violence perpetrators. Focusing on the subnational level, I argue that variation in rents helps explain why some incumbents recruit armed groups while others rely on ordinary citizens. Incumbents with access to large rents can afford to hire costly yet effective armed groups. In contrast, those with limited rents recruit cheaper but less capable alternatives such as ordinary citizens. I use over one hundred interviews conducted with politicians, journalists, voters, civil society members and citizens in four Nigerian states, Lagos, Rivers, Plateau and Nasarawa, to probe the plausibility of the argument. I triangulate interview findings with newspapers and observer reports. Findings show that in Lagos and Rivers, incumbents hire and maintain armed groups such as transport workers and cult groups due to high rents, while those in the low-rents state of Nasarawa hire citizens to perpetrate violence. The study contributes to the literature on decentralization, joint production of political violence, and the resource curse.