The secrecy and science of Cold War atoms in the Netherlands and Norway

This study focuses on a unique nuclear collaboration between the Netherlands and Norway in the early Cold War, with special attention to the role of secrecy. A small joint research reactor was completed in Norway in July 1951. In addition, a small device to enrich uranium—a "calutron"—was realized in the summer of 1953 in Amsterdam. In those years America pursued a strict policy of secrecy and control of nuclear materials such as uranium. It was not until December 1953 that US President Eisenhower announced a relaxation of this policy; the "Atoms for Peace" program. The realization of these capabilities under a regime of maximum restrictions provides an ideal case for studying knowledge limitation and the relationship between science and secrecy. How did scientists and state officials deal with secrecy? How and why did the boundaries of secrecy shift over time? Three decisive factors can be identified for secret knowledge and technology to move: possession of special nuclear materials such as heavy water or uranium, scientists with a strong international network, and political will to support nuclear development. Norwegian and some Dutch assistance extended to third countries in the period up to 1960. Finally, secrecy was important in the joint project in a specific way: it enabled the production of scientific disinformation as a Cold War weapon. Openness and secrecy alternated to reflect changing power relations within Cold War science. As this history shows, secrecy is a convenient historiographical instrument to reveal such essential historical patterns.