Decentralization in Open Quorum Systems: Limitative Results for Ripple and Stellar

Open Access
Authors
Publication date 02-2021
Host editors
  • E. Anceaume
  • C. Bisière
  • M. Bouvard
  • Q. Bramas
  • C. Casamatta
Book title 2nd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols
Book subtitle Tokenomics 2020, October 26-27, 2020, Toulouse, France
ISBN (electronic)
  • 9783959771573
Series OASIcs - Open Access Series in Informatics
Event 2nd International Conference on Blockchain Economics, Security and Protocols, Tokenomics 2020
Article number 5
Number of pages 20
Publisher Saarbrücken/Wadern: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
Organisations
  • Faculty of Law (FdR) - Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics (ACLE)
  • Interfacultary Research - Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC)
Abstract
Decentralisation is one of the promises introduced by blockchain technologies: fair and secure interaction amongst peers with no dominant positions, single points of failure or censorship. Decentralisation, however, appears difficult to be formally defined, possibly a continuum property of systems that can be more or less decentralised, or can tend to decentralisation in their lifetime. In this paper we focus on decentralisation in quorum-based approaches to open (permissionless) consensus as illustrated in influential protocols such as the Ripple and Stellar protocols. Drawing from game theory and computational complexity, we establish limiting results concerning the decentralisation vs. safety trade-off in Ripple and Stellar, and we propose a novel methodology to formalise and quantitatively analyse decentralisation in this type of blockchains.
Document type Conference contribution
Language English
Published at https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.Tokenomics.2020.5
Other links https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85115863014
Downloads
OASIcs-Tokenomics-2020-5 (Final published version)
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