M&A Negotiations and Lawyer Expertise

Authors
Publication date 2013
Number of pages 23
Publisher Amsterdam / Berkeley, California: Universiteit van Amsterdam / University of California Berkeley
Organisations
  • Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) - Amsterdam Business School Research Institute (ABS-RI)
Abstract
We use proprietary data to look into the "black box" of M&A negotiations and to shed light on the
effects of lawyer expertise on M&A contract design, the bargaining process, and acquisition pricing.
Measuring the effects of buyer relative to seller lawyer expertise, we document that more expertise
is associated with more beneficial negotiation outcomes across several dimensions. Lawyer fixed
effects and geographic‐proximity instruments allow us to address concerns about the endogenous
allocation of lawyers to deals or clients. Our results help explain the importance of league table
rankings and the variation in legal fees within the legal M&A services industry.
Document type Working paper
Note May 2013
Language English
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