How do we assess how happy we are? Tenets, implications and tenability of three theories

Open Access
Authors
  • R. Veenhoven
Publication date 2009
Host editors
  • A.K. Dutt
  • B. Radcliff
Book title Happiness, economics and politics: towards a multi-disciplinary approach
ISBN
  • 9781848440937
Pages (from-to) 45-69
Number of pages 362
Publisher Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
Organisations
  • Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences (FMG) - Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (AISSR)
Abstract
Utilitarian moral philosophy holds that we should aim at greater happiness for a greater number. Yet two theories about how we assess how happy we are imply that there is not much value in happiness and that happiness cannot de raised lastingly. These two theories are: (1) ‘Set-point’ theory, which holds that we are mentally programmed for a certain degree of happiness, and (2) ‘Comparison’ theory holding that happiness results from a rational mental calculus involving comparison with standard of the good life. An alternative mental theory that fit better with utilitarian creed is the (3) ‘Affect’ theory that happiness depends on unreasoned emotional experience, which reflects gratification of needs.
These theories are described, their theoretical plausibility is discussed and the empirical support evaluated. It is concluded that the first two theories fall short as a general explanation. Happiness seems to be inferred from how we feel in the first place. Hence there is no reality ground for rejecting the greatest happiness principle as a moral lead.
Document type Chapter
Language English
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Pre-review manuscript (preprint) (Submitted manuscript)
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