State actor-social movement coalitions and policy-making under authoritarianism: the Moroccan Party of Justice and development in the urban municipality of Kenitra

This article examines the conditions under which state actor-social movement (sasm) coalitions form in policy-making in authoritarian states. Based on a comparison of three cases of policy reform undertaken by the Party of Justice and Development (pjd) in the municipality of Kenitra, Morocco, it argues: 1) in authoritarian states, we must analyse sasm interactions and the interactions between elected state actors and nominated state actors representing the central authorities; 2) the pjd forms coalitions with social movement organizations (smos) depending whether its policy preference is in opposition to the authorities’ and whether it has mass appeal; 3) when its preference conflicts with that of the authorities yet has broad support, the pjd formally mobilizes smos; when it conflicts with the authorities’ preference but has limited appeal, informal party-social movement coalitions are formed; and when it is neither in conflict with the authorities’ preference nor has mass appeal, coalitions are unnecessary.