Gift exchange in a multi-worker firm

Open Access
Authors
Publication date 2007
Journal Economic Journal
Volume | Issue number 117 | 522
Pages (from-to) 1025-1050
Number of pages 26
Organisations
  • Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) - Amsterdam School of Economics Research Institute (ASE-RI)
Abstract
One of the main findings of a large body of gift exchange experiments is that a considerable fraction of workers reward higher wages with higher effort. These results are observed for simple one-employer-one-worker relationships. In this article we investigate whether they generalise to the more realistic situation in which the employer employs several workers. We compare a bilateral gift exchange game with a treatment in which each employer has four workers. We find that effort levels in the latter treatment are only marginally lower. Gift exchange thus appears to be robust to increases in the size of the workforce.

Document type Article
Published at https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02065.x
Downloads
Preprint (Submitted manuscript)
Permalink to this page
Back