Pushed for Being Better On the Possibility and Desirability of Moral Nudging
| Authors |
|
|---|---|
| Publication date | June 2026 |
| Journal | Journal of Value Inquiry |
| Volume | Issue number | 60 | 2 |
| Pages (from-to) | 299–325 |
| Number of pages | 27 |
| Organisations |
|
| Abstract |
Despite the initial focus on paternalistic nudges that promote the “health, wealth, and happiness” of nudgees (Thaler & Sunstein 2008), the literature now increasingly discusses the use of nudging techniques for other purposes, like promoting social, civic, or green behavior amongst nudgees. In this paper, we examine whether those can plausibly be labeled ‘moral nudges’. To do so, we ask whether the deliberate design of people’s choice environments can actually promote genuine moral thinking, feeling and acting. Our main aim is to analyze the alleged tension between nudging on the one hand and moral worth on the other and to argue that ‘moral nudging’ is not an oxymoron. In addition, we analyze which moral nudges are desirable. Given how nudges are increasingly popular tools in moral education and in
attempts to make people behave in arguably moral ways (donating to good causes, performing civic duties, et cetera), it is important to assess whether and when nudges undermine, preserve or promote the moral worth of resulting actions. |
| Document type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Published at |
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-023-09977-y
(Final published version)
|
| Downloads |
s10790-023-09977-y
(Final published version)
|
| Permalink to this page | |
